Kuhn and Galbraith on habitual ideas

Regarding your thoughts on habitual ideas Karla...I thought you might enjoy the following quotes.

Thomas Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, wrote that an accepted body of knowledge “does not aim for novelties of fact or theory, and, when successful, finds none.” (p52)

 

Even when confronted by severe and prolonged failure “though they may begin to lose faith and then to consider alternatives, they do not renounce the paradigm that has led them into crisis.” (p77)

J.K. Galbraith, in The Affluent Society, sought to explain the persistence of "the conventional wisdom". He wrote that “Numerous factors contribute to the acceptability of ideas. To a very large extent, of course, we associate truth with convenience – with what most closely accords with self-interest and personal well-being or promises best to avoid awkward effort and unwelcome dislocation of life. We also find highly acceptable what contributes most to self-esteem.” (p7)

“Ideas are inherently conservative,” he concluded. “They yield not to the attack of other ideas but to the massive onslaught of circumstances with which they cannot contend.” As a result. “like the Old Guard, the conventional wisdom dies but does not surrender.” (p17, p12)

Sources: Thomas S. Kuhn 1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Third edition 1996, The University of Chicago Press

 J.K. Galbraith, The Affluent Society (1958) Penguin Books edition 1999

The short answer is that habitual ideas often provide pay-offs, in career, prestige, income, power and convenience etc for those who hold them. These ideas become part of people's identity, so its not surprising they defend them to the death. Such ideas are rarely defeated by frontal attack...they have to be slowly exterminated by the social triumph of better ideas!

- Les

The problem with Social Marketing - why you can't sell change like soap

If you work in health promotion or sustainability, you’ll have heard of “Social Marketing” and “Community-based Social Marketing”.

Lately I’ve noticed how these communication methodologies are being treated with almost magical reverence, as if they are the long-awaited silver bullets for the complex social, health and environmental problems we all struggle with.

I believe many of the expectations being placed on Social Marketing and Community-based Social Marketing are seriously overblown and it’s time social change practitioners reassessed their attitude to these practices.

Here’s why:

Of course you can market brands. But behaviour change is not like buying a different brand of beer, it’s about getting people to DO THINGS THEY ARE UNCOMFORTABLE WITH, DON’T WANT TO DO OR CAN’T DO, or they would already be doing them. Like parents letting their kids walk to school, or smokers quitting, or drivers switching to public transport.

These kinds of social, health and environmental behaviours are intractable because they are part of complex, “wicked” or messy social problems. That’s why they are still with us. They are intractable for very good reasons: they are fixed firmly in place by a powerful matrix of institutional, technological and social factors. To be effective change programs must therefore do more than just communicate persuasive messages, they must aim to modify those factors.

Paul Stern of the Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education of the UK’s National Research Council explains that many behaviours are simply not amenable to voluntary change: [i]

“This pattern of [contextual] influences implies that effective laws and regulations, strong financial incentives or penalties, irresistible technology, powerful social norms, and the like can leave little room for personal factors to affect behavior…”

In other words, when people have very little choice how they act, structural changes (like regulation, pricing, infrastructure, service provision, governance reform, social innovation, and technological innovation) should be the preferred approaches.

He goes on to say that: “[however] when contextual influences are weak, personal factors…are likely to be the strongest influence on behavior.” However, if we are realistic, there are very few situations where contextual factors are weak. Every personal decision is thoroughly embedded on its context. Even a simple voluntary behaviour like “turning off the lights” is determined by technology and pricing.

The fact is, every effective social change effort has been predominantly structural. Improving the anti-social behaviour of drinkers, for instance, has required collaboration between police, community leaders and licensing authorities; physical re-design of venues; modified management practices; training for staff; advocacy; political leadership; and legislative change. Marketing has been the least important factor in the mix. Most solutions to “wicked” problems are like this. They involve multi-faceted strategies, and are very much about building relationships and re-designing practices, places and institutions, with marketing taking an important supportive role.

Of course there’s nothing wrong with good marketing. It’s a vital part of the mix. It spreads knowledge, creates interest, helps get people buzzing, and helps spark political action so that politicians get busy with the work of changing institutions and supporting technological innovation. It is an important handmaiden of change, but not the driver....

The rest of this paper is at www.enablingchange.com.au   It looks at the shape of successful interventions into "wicked problems", details weaknesses in the Social Marketing approach, and suggests an alternative approach.

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[i] Paul C. Stern (2005) Individuals’ Environmentally Significant Behaviour, Environmental Law Reporter News and Analysis 35 10785

How to bust silos

An article by Graham Winter, an Australian organisational psychologist, with some nicely expressed ideas about minimising organisational silos.


When initiatives failed
Our studies showed that when business initiatives failed, the 'players' were likely to be:

1. pursuing their own agenda: there was no shared bigger picture between units and little understanding or empathy for others, and leaders allowed conflicting agendas to prevail
2. avoiding and denying: employees avoided reality checks, there was a limited use of data in feedback and decision-making and the company had poor problem-solving practices
3. stifling communication: there was an absence of listening, e-mail was used as the main means of communication, there was a prevalence of hoarded information and alternative views were often dismissed
4. protecting their own turf: employees prioritised and planned in isolation, used their status to influence decisions and fostered inconsistency in processes and systems
5. playing 'I win, you lose': employees were blamed as soon as things went wrong, and success was rewarded inside the silos rather than across the company.

When initiatives succeeded
When business initiatives succeeded, the 'players' were likely to be:

1. sharing the big picture: companies created and shared one big picture, found common goals and synergies and focused on what was best for the organisation
2. sharing the reality: employees were focused on real performance, made fact-based decisions and had the tough conversation rather than avoiding reality
3. sharing the air: companies invited ideas from employees in every area of the business, and employees expressed opinions clearly and succinctly and listened to others
4. sharing the load: employees prioritised and planned together, were clear about roles and expectations and looked for common ground
5. sharing the wins and losses: companies paid close attention to joint results, learned and adapted together and rewarded true performance.

The dream team to tackle obesity

A recent US National Research Council report, Local Government Actions to Prevent Obesity provides a nice summary of the kind of interventions that have the best potential to tackle childhood obesity. 

According to the press release: “Many of these steps focus on increasing access to healthy foods and opportunities for active play and exercise.  They include:

- providing incentives to lure grocery stores to underserved neighborhoods;

- eliminating outdoor ads for high-calorie, low-nutrient foods and drinks near schools; requiring calorie and other nutritional information on restaurant menus; 

- implementing local "Safe Routes to School" programs; 

- regulating minimum play space and time in child care programs; 

- rerouting buses or developing other transportation strategies that ensure people can get to grocery stores; and 

- using building codes to ensure facilities have working water fountains.”

So, here's the dream team you'd need for a comprehensive attack on obesity at the local government level:

- an incentive manager;

- a regulator; 

- a building code planner; 

- a nutritionist; 

- a transport planner; 

- an educator; 

- a courageous politician or two to drive these changes through; and

- a facilitator, to pull it all together.

What to do about "habits"

My friend Karla rang me and asked if I knew of any research about "habits". I had a look (Google Scholar "psychology, habit") and discovered that the psychology of habit is seriously under-researched.

(Except for one article that argued that habit was "goal-directed automaticity".)

So I thought about it, and I think that habit might consist of at least 5 different entities. Interesting thing is, when you consider each entity separately you get some ideas about how to overcome what can seem to be ingrained habits.

1) Pay-off. Some habits are maintained because they "work". So, for instance, someone habitually accepts plastic bags at the supermarket, because that delivers ease and convenience.

Solution: make the practice less convenient, and it's alternative more convenient.

2) Obliviousness. Some habits are maintained because we aren't paying attention. For instance, I habitually ignore roadside speeding signs because I just don't see them (really!) The human brain only has so much attention to spread around, and we might be just habitually paying attention to other things (like our thoughts). [Google "salience"].

Solution: prompt people to pay attention to the matter.

3) Sunk costs (or 'loss aversion'). We may have invested a lot of money, time or prestige in a particular practice. Because humans naturally overestimate losses compared to potential gains, we often defend our investments to the point of stupidity. [Google "Loss Aversion"]

Solution: encourage people to consider the 'big picture' or 'long view' where the the long-term gain is worth the short-term loss.

4) Denial or resistance. Where fear of the unfamiliar causes us to avoid information about it, and resist pressure to change our behaviour.
[Google "Cognitive Dissonance" and "Psychological Reactance"]

Solution: increase the familiarity of the new practice.

5) Social identity. Where someone's social identity is wrapped up in a practice, change can threaten their identity and relationships, so naturally they actively maintain that practice (a case of denial, really).

Solution: connect the new practice to people's values.

The uncanny similarity between counterinsurgency warfare and social change

Just got my issue of Campaign Strategy eLetter. Chris Rose mentioned David Kilcullen's 28 Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency so I looked it up. (Kilcullen is a former Australian Army lieutenant colonel who served in Iraq as a senior counterinsurgency advisor and now works for the US State Department).

It's uncanny how closely these hard-edged lessons in counterinsurgency warfare resemble sensible lessons in running social change projects. Just have a look. I suppose we should have suspected that, after all think about Sun Tzu's "The Art of War".

I especially liked his "4 What-ifs". See if this resonates with your experience of trying to get things done in the real world.

Four What Ifs

The articles above describe what should happen, but we all know that things go wrong. Here are some "what ifs" to consider:

What if you get moved to a different area? You prepared for ar-Ramadi and studied Dulaim tribal structures and Sunni beliefs. Now you are going to Najaf and will be surrounded by al-Hassan and Unizzah tribes and Shiía communities. But that work was not wasted. In mastering your first area, you learned techniques you can apply: how to "case" an operational area, how to decide what matters in the local societal structure. Do the same again - and this time the process is easier and faster, since you have an existing mental structure, and can focus on what is different. The same applies if you get moved frequently within a battalion or brigade area.

What if higher headquarters doesn't get counterinsurgency? Higher headquarters is telling you the mission is to "kill terrorist", or pushing for high-speed armored patrols and a base-camp mentality. They just do not seem to understand counterinsurgency. This is not uncommon, since company-grade officers today often have more combat experience than senior officers. In this case, just do what you can. Try not to create expectations that higher headquarters will not let you meet. Apply the adage "first do no harm". Over time, you will find ways to do what you have to do. But never lie to higher headquarters about your locations or activities: they own the indirect fires.

What if you have no resources? Yours is a low-priority sector: you have no linguists, the aid agencies have no money for projects in your area, you have a low priority for funding. You can still get things done, but you need to focus on self-reliance, keep things small and sustainable, and ruthlessly prioritize effort. Local community leaders are your allies in this: they know what matters to them more than you do. Be honest with them, discuss possible projects and options with community leaders, get them to choose what their priority is. Often they will find the translators, building supplies or expertise that you need, and will only expect your support and protection in making their projects work. And the process of negotiation and consultation will help mobilize their support, and strengthen their social cohesion. If you set your sights on what is achievable, the situation can still work.

What if the theater situation shifts under your feet? It is your worst nightmare: everything has gone well in your sector, but the whole theater situation has changed and invalidates your efforts. Think of the first battle of Fallujah, the al-Askariya shrine bombing, or the Sadr uprising. What do you do? Here is where having a flexible, adaptive game plan comes in. Just as the insurgents drop down to a lower posture when things go wrong, now is the time to drop back a stage, consolidate, regain your balance and prepare to expand again when the situation allows. But see article 28: if you cede the initiative, you must regain it as soon as the situation allows, or you will eventually lose.

That all sounds like great advice!

How calculating eco-footprints undermines good behaviour

I always felt a little uncomfortable about the idea of calculating my own ecological footprint...now I know why:

In an experiment with 212 undergraduates, Psychologists Amara Brook and Jennifer Crocker found that for those "not heavily invested in the environment", negative feedback about their ecological footprint undermined their environmental behaviour.

"Rather than changing their ways to protect the environment, the results of this study suggest that these [people] may give up on their efforts to protect the environment", they wrote.

However for those "more invested on the environment", calculating their ecological footprint promoted more sustainable behaviour.

This research was reported in USA Today, but doesn't seem to have been formally published yet because I can't find it on Google Scholar.

However if you're keen you could email Amara directly on atbrook@scu.edu and maybe she'd send you a copy.

It's easy to guess at the mechanism at work: a straightforward (and, when you think about it, fairly predictable) case of DENIAL (aka Cognitive Dissonance).

Incidentally, while I was tracking down info on Amara Brook I stumbled across a "Conservation Psychology" website with an amazingly detailed collection of resources, including a huge number of scholarly articles on the subject: http://www.conservationpsychology.org/resources/articles/

The USA Today article also reported some interesting research, by Elizabeth Nisbett and John Zelenski at the Carleton University in Ottawa, that found that people tend to systematically underestimate how much happier they'll feel from spending 15 minutes outside, and overestimate how happy they are being inside.